It also regulates the use and disclosure of information obtained through authorized wiretapping. A primary condition for granting Title III surveillance is probable cause to believe the target has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an enumerated crime. There must also be probable cause to believe that communications concerning the offense will be obtained by surveillance, probable cause to believe that facilities to be surveilled are being used in connection with the offense, and;.
Normal investigative techniques have been tried and failed — or appear unlikely to succeed if tried. FISA Surveillance is a bit more complicated. Which makes FISA more susceptible to manipulation and abuse.
FISA Title I and III provisions relate to the conduct of electronic surveillance and physical searches for foreign intelligence purposes of persons, facilities, or property inside the United States. FISA Title I and Title III surveillance require there be probable cause to believe the proposed target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and that the facility can be a phone number or place is — or is about to be — used by that target.
Carter Page, a U.
Section permits the government to target for surveillance foreign persons located outside the United States for the purpose of acquiring foreign intelligence information. Due to frequency of collection, instead of issuing individual court orders, the FISC approves annual certifications submitted by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence that specify categories of foreign intelligence information the government is authorized to acquire pursuant to Section The Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence must also certify that Intelligence Community elements will follow targeting procedures and minimization procedures that are approved by the FISC as part of the annual certification.
In practice, these annual certifications are the responsibility of the National Security Division. Targeting procedures are designed to ensure that only foreign persons located outside the U.
Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act
Minimization procedures are intended to protect any U. A foreign person who has been targeted for collection under FISA Section may communicate with, or discuss information concerning, a U.
FISC approved minimization procedures regulate the retention and dissemination of information concerning U. Persons, including who may receive such information and how it is handled.
Generally, queries of raw content are only permitted if they are reasonably designed to identify foreign intelligence information, although the FBI may also conduct such queries to identify evidence of a crime.
Citizens is generally not destroyed. When the U. Querying databases containing Section information does not result in any new acquisition of data; it is instead an examination or re-examination of previously acquired information.
Most Section collection involves the government acquiring data from the company providing the electronic communication service to the user — known as downstream collection. In downstream surveillance, U. The companies are then prohibited from telling their users that their data has been turned over to the government. In simple parlance, upstream surveillance means the NSA effectively taps into the high capacity fiber optic cables that carry Internet traffic and copy all of the data flowing through those cables.
This was formally announced on April 28, As part of this curtailment, NSA will delete the vast majority of previously acquired upstream internet communications as soon as practicable. The U. Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure extends to the interception of communications and applies to all conversations where an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.
FISA surveillance has provided meaningful intelligence — but it has also produced meaningful abuses. Information lies within the NSA Database, subject to simple queries. This post is not meant to be an examination or critique of the legal or ethical justifications for FISA surveillance.
It is intended to be explanatory in nature and serve as a backdrop to understanding the real FISA abuses that occurred between November and April 18,